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 1 #  # This is the "master security properties file".  #  # An alternate java.security properties file may be specified  # from the command line via the system property  #  # -Djava.security.properties=  #  # This properties file appends to the master security properties file.  # If both properties files specify values for the same key, the value  # from the command-line properties file is selected, as it is the last  # one loaded.  #  # Also, if you specify  #  # -Djava.security.properties== (2 equals),  #  # then that properties file completely overrides the master security  # properties file.  #  # To disable the ability to specify an additional properties file from  # the command line, set the key security.overridePropertiesFile  # to false in the master security properties file. It is set to true  # by default.  # In this file, various security properties are set for use by  # java.security classes. This is where users can statically register  # Cryptography Package Providers ("providers" for short). The term  # "provider" refers to a package or set of packages that supply a  # concrete implementation of a subset of the cryptography aspects of  # the Java Security API. A provider may, for example, implement one or  # more digital signature algorithms or message digest algorithms.  #  # Each provider must implement a subclass of the Provider class.  # To register a provider in this master security properties file,  # specify the Provider subclass name and priority in the format  #  # security.provider.=  #  # This declares a provider, and specifies its preference  # order n. The preference order is the order in which providers are  # searched for requested algorithms (when no specific provider is  # requested). The order is 1-based; 1 is the most preferred, followed  # by 2, and so on.  #  # must specify the subclass of the Provider class whose  # constructor sets the values of various properties that are required  # for the Java Security API to look up the algorithms or other  # facilities implemented by the provider.  #  # There must be at least one provider specification in java.security.  # There is a default provider that comes standard with the JDK. It  # is called the "SUN" provider, and its Provider subclass  # named Sun appears in the sun.security.provider package. Thus, the  # "SUN" provider is registered via the following:  #  # security.provider.1=sun.security.provider.Sun  #  # (The number 1 is used for the default provider.)  #  # Note: Providers can be dynamically registered instead by calls to  # either the addProvider or insertProviderAt method in the Security  # class.  #  # List of providers and their preference orders (see above):  #  security.provider.1=sun.security.provider.Sun  security.provider.2=sun.security.rsa.SunRsaSign  security.provider.3=sun.security.ec.SunEC  security.provider.4=com.sun.net.ssl.internal.ssl.Provider  security.provider.5=com.sun.crypto.provider.SunJCE  security.provider.6=sun.security.jgss.SunProvider  security.provider.7=com.sun.security.sasl.Provider  security.provider.8=org.jcp.xml.dsig.internal.dom.XMLDSigRI  security.provider.9=sun.security.smartcardio.SunPCSC  security.provider.10=sun.security.mscapi.SunMSCAPI  #  # Sun Provider SecureRandom seed source.  #  # Select the primary source of seed data for the "SHA1PRNG" and  # "NativePRNG" SecureRandom implementations in the "Sun" provider.  # (Other SecureRandom implementations might also use this property.)  #  # On Unix-like systems (for example, Solaris/Linux/MacOS), the  # "NativePRNG" and "SHA1PRNG" implementations obtains seed data from  # special device files such as file:/dev/random.  #  # On Windows systems, specifying the URLs "file:/dev/random" or  # "file:/dev/urandom" will enable the native Microsoft CryptoAPI seeding  # mechanism for SHA1PRNG.  #  # By default, an attempt is made to use the entropy gathering device  # specified by the "securerandom.source" Security property. If an  # exception occurs while accessing the specified URL:  #  # SHA1PRNG:  # the traditional system/thread activity algorithm will be used.  #  # NativePRNG:  # a default value of /dev/random will be used. If neither  # are available, the implementation will be disabled.  # "file" is the only currently supported protocol type.  #  # The entropy gathering device can also be specified with the System  # property "java.security.egd". For example:  #  # % java -Djava.security.egd=file:/dev/random MainClass  #  # Specifying this System property will override the  # "securerandom.source" Security property.  #  # In addition, if "file:/dev/random" or "file:/dev/urandom" is  # specified, the "NativePRNG" implementation will be more preferred than  # SHA1PRNG in the Sun provider.  #  securerandom.source=file:/dev/random  #  # A list of known strong SecureRandom implementations.  #  # To help guide applications in selecting a suitable strong  # java.security.SecureRandom implementation, Java distributions should  # indicate a list of known strong implementations using the property.  #  # This is a comma-separated list of algorithm and/or algorithm:provider  # entries.  #  securerandom.strongAlgorithms=Windows-PRNG:SunMSCAPI,SHA1PRNG:SUN  #  # Class to instantiate as the javax.security.auth.login.Configuration  # provider.  #  login.configuration.provider=sun.security.provider.ConfigFile  #  # Default login configuration file  #  #login.config.url.1=file:${user.home}/.java.login.config  #  # Class to instantiate as the system Policy. This is the name of the class  # that will be used as the Policy object.  #  policy.provider=sun.security.provider.PolicyFile  # The default is to have a single system-wide policy file,  # and a policy file in the user's home directory.  policy.url.1=file:${java.home}/lib/security/java.policy  policy.url.2=file:${user.home}/.java.policy  # whether or not we expand properties in the policy file  # if this is set to false, properties (${...}) will not be expanded in policy  # files.  policy.expandProperties=true  # whether or not we allow an extra policy to be passed on the command line  # with -Djava.security.policy=somefile. Comment out this line to disable  # this feature.  policy.allowSystemProperty=true  # whether or not we look into the IdentityScope for trusted Identities  # when encountering a 1.1 signed JAR file. If the identity is found  # and is trusted, we grant it AllPermission.  policy.ignoreIdentityScope=false  #  # Default keystore type.  #  keystore.type=jks  #  # Controls compatibility mode for the JKS keystore type.  #  # When set to 'true', the JKS keystore type supports loading  # keystore files in either JKS or PKCS12 format. When set to 'false'  # it supports loading only JKS keystore files.  #  keystore.type.compat=true  #  # List of comma-separated packages that start with or equal this string  # will cause a security exception to be thrown when  # passed to checkPackageAccess unless the  # corresponding RuntimePermission ("accessClassInPackage."+package) has  # been granted.  package.access=sun.,\   com.sun.xml.internal.,\   com.sun.imageio.,\   com.sun.istack.internal.,\   com.sun.jmx.,\   com.sun.media.sound.,\   com.sun.naming.internal.,\   com.sun.proxy.,\   com.sun.corba.se.,\   com.sun.org.apache.bcel.internal.,\   com.sun.org.apache.regexp.internal.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xpath.internal.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.extensions.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.lib.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.res.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.templates.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.utils.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xslt.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.cmdline.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.compiler.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.util.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.res.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.resolver.helpers.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.resolver.readers.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.security.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.utils.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.utils.,\   com.sun.org.glassfish.,\   com.oracle.xmlns.internal.,\   com.oracle.webservices.internal.,\   oracle.jrockit.jfr.,\   org.jcp.xml.dsig.internal.,\   jdk.internal.,\   jdk.nashorn.internal.,\   jdk.nashorn.tools.,\   jdk.xml.internal.,\   com.sun.activation.registries.,\   com.sun.java.accessibility.,\   com.sun.browser.,\   com.sun.glass.,\   com.sun.javafx.,\   com.sun.media.,\   com.sun.openpisces.,\   com.sun.prism.,\   com.sun.scenario.,\   com.sun.t2k.,\   com.sun.pisces.,\   com.sun.webkit.,\   jdk.management.resource.internal.  #  # List of comma-separated packages that start with or equal this string  # will cause a security exception to be thrown when  # passed to checkPackageDefinition unless the  # corresponding RuntimePermission ("defineClassInPackage."+package) has  # been granted.  #  # by default, none of the class loaders supplied with the JDK call  # checkPackageDefinition.  #  package.definition=sun.,\   com.sun.xml.internal.,\   com.sun.imageio.,\   com.sun.istack.internal.,\   com.sun.jmx.,\   com.sun.media.sound.,\   com.sun.naming.internal.,\   com.sun.proxy.,\   com.sun.corba.se.,\   com.sun.org.apache.bcel.internal.,\   com.sun.org.apache.regexp.internal.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xpath.internal.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.extensions.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.lib.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.res.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.templates.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.utils.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xslt.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.cmdline.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.compiler.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.util.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.res.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.resolver.helpers.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.resolver.readers.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.security.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.utils.,\   com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.utils.,\   com.sun.org.glassfish.,\   com.oracle.xmlns.internal.,\   com.oracle.webservices.internal.,\   oracle.jrockit.jfr.,\   org.jcp.xml.dsig.internal.,\   jdk.internal.,\   jdk.nashorn.internal.,\   jdk.nashorn.tools.,\   jdk.xml.internal.,\   com.sun.activation.registries.,\   com.sun.java.accessibility.,\   com.sun.browser.,\   com.sun.glass.,\   com.sun.javafx.,\   com.sun.media.,\   com.sun.openpisces.,\   com.sun.prism.,\   com.sun.scenario.,\   com.sun.t2k.,\   com.sun.pisces.,\   com.sun.webkit.,\   jdk.management.resource.internal.  #  # Determines whether this properties file can be appended to  # or overridden on the command line via -Djava.security.properties  #  security.overridePropertiesFile=true  #  # Determines the default key and trust manager factory algorithms for  # the javax.net.ssl package.  #  ssl.KeyManagerFactory.algorithm=SunX509  ssl.TrustManagerFactory.algorithm=PKIX  #  # The Java-level namelookup cache policy for successful lookups:  #  # any negative value: caching forever  # any positive value: the number of seconds to cache an address for  # zero: do not cache  #  # default value is forever (FOREVER). For security reasons, this  # caching is made forever when a security manager is set. When a security  # manager is not set, the default behavior in this implementation  # is to cache for 30 seconds.  #  # NOTE: setting this to anything other than the default value can have  # serious security implications. Do not set it unless  # you are sure you are not exposed to DNS spoofing attack.  #  #networkaddress.cache.ttl=-1  # The Java-level namelookup cache policy for failed lookups:  #  # any negative value: cache forever  # any positive value: the number of seconds to cache negative lookup results  # zero: do not cache  #  # In some Microsoft Windows networking environments that employ  # the WINS name service in addition to DNS, name service lookups  # that fail may take a noticeably long time to return (approx. 5 seconds).  # For this reason the default caching policy is to maintain these  # results for 10 seconds.  #  #  networkaddress.cache.negative.ttl=10  #  # Properties to configure OCSP for certificate revocation checking  #  # Enable OCSP  #  # By default, OCSP is not used for certificate revocation checking.  # This property enables the use of OCSP when set to the value "true".  #  # NOTE: SocketPermission is required to connect to an OCSP responder.  #  # Example,  # ocsp.enable=true  #  # Location of the OCSP responder  #  # By default, the location of the OCSP responder is determined implicitly  # from the certificate being validated. This property explicitly specifies  # the location of the OCSP responder. The property is used when the  # Authority Information Access extension (defined in RFC 3280) is absent  # from the certificate or when it requires overriding.  #  # Example,  # ocsp.responderURL=http://ocsp.example.net:80  #  # Subject name of the OCSP responder's certificate  #  # By default, the certificate of the OCSP responder is that of the issuer  # of the certificate being validated. This property identifies the certificate  # of the OCSP responder when the default does not apply. Its value is a string  # distinguished name (defined in RFC 2253) which identifies a certificate in  # the set of certificates supplied during cert path validation. In cases where  # the subject name alone is not sufficient to uniquely identify the certificate  # then both the "ocsp.responderCertIssuerName" and  # "ocsp.responderCertSerialNumber" properties must be used instead. When this  # property is set then those two properties are ignored.  #  # Example,  # ocsp.responderCertSubjectName="CN=OCSP Responder, O=XYZ Corp"  #  # Issuer name of the OCSP responder's certificate  #  # By default, the certificate of the OCSP responder is that of the issuer  # of the certificate being validated. This property identifies the certificate  # of the OCSP responder when the default does not apply. Its value is a string  # distinguished name (defined in RFC 2253) which identifies a certificate in  # the set of certificates supplied during cert path validation. When this  # property is set then the "ocsp.responderCertSerialNumber" property must also  # be set. When the "ocsp.responderCertSubjectName" property is set then this  # property is ignored.  #  # Example,  # ocsp.responderCertIssuerName="CN=Enterprise CA, O=XYZ Corp"  #  # Serial number of the OCSP responder's certificate  #  # By default, the certificate of the OCSP responder is that of the issuer  # of the certificate being validated. This property identifies the certificate  # of the OCSP responder when the default does not apply. Its value is a string  # of hexadecimal digits (colon or space separators may be present) which  # identifies a certificate in the set of certificates supplied during cert path  # validation. When this property is set then the "ocsp.responderCertIssuerName"  # property must also be set. When the "ocsp.responderCertSubjectName" property  # is set then this property is ignored.  #  # Example,  # ocsp.responderCertSerialNumber=2A:FF:00  #  # Policy for failed Kerberos KDC lookups:  #  # When a KDC is unavailable (network error, service failure, etc), it is  # put inside a blacklist and accessed less often for future requests. The  # value (case-insensitive) for this policy can be:  #  # tryLast  # KDCs in the blacklist are always tried after those not on the list.  #  # tryLess[:max_retries,timeout]  # KDCs in the blacklist are still tried by their order in the configuration,  # but with smaller max_retries and timeout values. max_retries and timeout  # are optional numerical parameters (default 1 and 5000, which means once  # and 5 seconds). Please notes that if any of the values defined here is  # more than what is defined in krb5.conf, it will be ignored.  #  # Whenever a KDC is detected as available, it is removed from the blacklist.  # The blacklist is reset when krb5.conf is reloaded. You can add  # refreshKrb5Config=true to a JAAS configuration file so that krb5.conf is  # reloaded whenever a JAAS authentication is attempted.  #  # Example,  # krb5.kdc.bad.policy = tryLast  # krb5.kdc.bad.policy = tryLess:2,2000  krb5.kdc.bad.policy = tryLast  # Algorithm restrictions for certification path (CertPath) processing  #  # In some environments, certain algorithms or key lengths may be undesirable  # for certification path building and validation. For example, "MD2" is  # generally no longer considered to be a secure hash algorithm. This section  # describes the mechanism for disabling algorithms based on algorithm name  # and/or key length. This includes algorithms used in certificates, as well  # as revocation information such as CRLs and signed OCSP Responses.  # The syntax of the disabled algorithm string is described as follows:  # DisabledAlgorithms:  # " DisabledAlgorithm { , DisabledAlgorithm } "  #  # DisabledAlgorithm:  # AlgorithmName [Constraint] { '&' Constraint }  #  # AlgorithmName:  # (see below)  #  # Constraint:  # KeySizeConstraint | CAConstraint | DenyAfterConstraint |  # UsageConstraint  #  # KeySizeConstraint:  # keySize Operator KeyLength  #  # Operator:  # <= | < | == | != | >= | >  #  # KeyLength:  # Integer value of the algorithm's key length in bits  #  # CAConstraint:  # jdkCA  #  # DenyAfterConstraint:  # denyAfter YYYY-MM-DD  #  # UsageConstraint:  # usage [TLSServer] [TLSClient] [SignedJAR]  #  # The "AlgorithmName" is the standard algorithm name of the disabled  # algorithm. See "Java Cryptography Architecture Standard Algorithm Name  # Documentation" for information about Standard Algorithm Names. Matching  # is performed using a case-insensitive sub-element matching rule. (For  # example, in "SHA1withECDSA" the sub-elements are "SHA1" for hashing and  # "ECDSA" for signatures.) If the assertion "AlgorithmName" is a  # sub-element of the certificate algorithm name, the algorithm will be  # rejected during certification path building and validation. For example,  # the assertion algorithm name "DSA" will disable all certificate algorithms  # that rely on DSA, such as NONEwithDSA, SHA1withDSA. However, the assertion  # will not disable algorithms related to "ECDSA".  #  # A "Constraint" defines restrictions on the keys and/or certificates for  # a specified AlgorithmName:  #  # KeySizeConstraint:  # keySize Operator KeyLength  # The constraint requires a key of a valid size range if the  # "AlgorithmName" is of a key algorithm. The "KeyLength" indicates  # the key size specified in number of bits. For example,  # "RSA keySize <= 1024" indicates that any RSA key with key size less  # than or equal to 1024 bits should be disabled, and  # "RSA keySize < 1024, RSA keySize > 2048" indicates that any RSA key  # with key size less than 1024 or greater than 2048 should be disabled.  # This constraint is only used on algorithms that have a key size.  #  # CAConstraint:  # jdkCA  # This constraint prohibits the specified algorithm only if the  # algorithm is used in a certificate chain that terminates at a marked  # trust anchor in the lib/security/cacerts keystore. If the jdkCA  # constraint is not set, then all chains using the specified algorithm  # are restricted. jdkCA may only be used once in a DisabledAlgorithm  # expression.  # Example: To apply this constraint to SHA-1 certificates, include  # the following: "SHA1 jdkCA"  #  # DenyAfterConstraint:  # denyAfter YYYY-MM-DD  # This constraint prohibits a certificate with the specified algorithm  # from being used after the date regardless of the certificate's  # validity. JAR files that are signed and timestamped before the  # constraint date with certificates containing the disabled algorithm  # will not be restricted. The date is processed in the UTC timezone.  # This constraint can only be used once in a DisabledAlgorithm  # expression.  # Example: To deny usage of RSA 2048 bit certificates after Feb 3 2020,  # use the following: "RSA keySize == 2048 & denyAfter 2020-02-03"  #  # UsageConstraint:  # usage [TLSServer] [TLSClient] [SignedJAR]  # This constraint prohibits the specified algorithm for  # a specified usage. This should be used when disabling an algorithm  # for all usages is not practical. 'TLSServer' restricts the algorithm  # in TLS server certificate chains when server authentication is  # performed. 'TLSClient' restricts the algorithm in TLS client  # certificate chains when client authentication is performed.  # 'SignedJAR' constrains use of certificates in signed jar files.  # The usage type follows the keyword and more than one usage type can  # be specified with a whitespace delimiter.  # Example: "SHA1 usage TLSServer TLSClient"  #  # When an algorithm must satisfy more than one constraint, it must be  # delimited by an ampersand '&'. For example, to restrict certificates in a  # chain that terminate at a distribution provided trust anchor and contain  # RSA keys that are less than or equal to 1024 bits, add the following  # constraint: "RSA keySize <= 1024 & jdkCA".  #  # All DisabledAlgorithms expressions are processed in the order defined in the  # property. This requires lower keysize constraints to be specified  # before larger keysize constraints of the same algorithm. For example:  # "RSA keySize < 1024 & jdkCA, RSA keySize < 2048".  #  # Note: The algorithm restrictions do not apply to trust anchors or  # self-signed certificates.  #  # Note: This property is currently used by Oracle's PKIX implementation. It  # is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.  #  # Example:  # jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms=MD2, DSA, RSA keySize < 2048  #  #  jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms=MD2, MD5, SHA1 jdkCA & usage TLSServer, \   RSA keySize < 1024, DSA keySize < 1024, EC keySize < 224  #  # Algorithm restrictions for signed JAR files  #  # In some environments, certain algorithms or key lengths may be undesirable  # for signed JAR validation. For example, "MD2" is generally no longer  # considered to be a secure hash algorithm. This section describes the  # mechanism for disabling algorithms based on algorithm name and/or key length.  # JARs signed with any of the disabled algorithms or key sizes will be treated  # as unsigned.  #  # The syntax of the disabled algorithm string is described as follows:  # DisabledAlgorithms:  # " DisabledAlgorithm { , DisabledAlgorithm } "  #  # DisabledAlgorithm:  # AlgorithmName [Constraint] { '&' Constraint }  #  # AlgorithmName:  # (see below)  #  # Constraint:  # KeySizeConstraint | DenyAfterConstraint  #  # KeySizeConstraint:  # keySize Operator KeyLength  #  # DenyAfterConstraint:  # denyAfter YYYY-MM-DD  #  # Operator:  # <= | < | == | != | >= | >  #  # KeyLength:  # Integer value of the algorithm's key length in bits  #  # Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference  # implementation. It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other  # implementations.  #  # See "jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms" for syntax descriptions.  #  jdk.jar.disabledAlgorithms=MD2, MD5, RSA keySize < 1024, DSA keySize < 1024  #  # Algorithm restrictions for Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security  # (SSL/TLS) processing  #  # In some environments, certain algorithms or key lengths may be undesirable  # when using SSL/TLS. This section describes the mechanism for disabling  # algorithms during SSL/TLS security parameters negotiation, including  # protocol version negotiation, cipher suites selection, peer authentication  # and key exchange mechanisms.  #  # Disabled algorithms will not be negotiated for SSL/TLS connections, even  # if they are enabled explicitly in an application.  #  # For PKI-based peer authentication and key exchange mechanisms, this list  # of disabled algorithms will also be checked during certification path  # building and validation, including algorithms used in certificates, as  # well as revocation information such as CRLs and signed OCSP Responses.  # This is in addition to the jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms property above.  #  # See the specification of "jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms" for the  # syntax of the disabled algorithm string.  #  # Note: The algorithm restrictions do not apply to trust anchors or  # self-signed certificates.  #  # Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.  # It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.  #  # Example:  # jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms=MD5, SSLv3, DSA, RSA keySize < 2048  jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms=SSLv3, RC4, MD5withRSA, DH keySize < 1024, \   EC keySize < 224, DES40_CBC, RC4_40, 3DES_EDE_CBC  # Legacy algorithms for Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS)  # processing in JSSE implementation.  #  # In some environments, a certain algorithm may be undesirable but it  # cannot be disabled because of its use in legacy applications. Legacy  # algorithms may still be supported, but applications should not use them  # as the security strength of legacy algorithms are usually not strong enough  # in practice.  #  # During SSL/TLS security parameters negotiation, legacy algorithms will  # not be negotiated unless there are no other candidates.  #  # The syntax of the legacy algorithms string is described as this Java  # BNF-style:  # LegacyAlgorithms:  # " LegacyAlgorithm { , LegacyAlgorithm } "  #  # LegacyAlgorithm:  # AlgorithmName (standard JSSE algorithm name)  #  # See the specification of security property "jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms"  # for the syntax and description of the "AlgorithmName" notation.  #  # Per SSL/TLS specifications, cipher suites have the form:  # SSL_KeyExchangeAlg_WITH_CipherAlg_MacAlg  # or  # TLS_KeyExchangeAlg_WITH_CipherAlg_MacAlg  #  # For example, the cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uses RSA as the  # key exchange algorithm, AES_128_CBC (128 bits AES cipher algorithm in CBC  # mode) as the cipher (encryption) algorithm, and SHA-1 as the message digest  # algorithm for HMAC.  #  # The LegacyAlgorithm can be one of the following standard algorithm names:  # 1. JSSE cipher suite name, e.g., TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA  # 2. JSSE key exchange algorithm name, e.g., RSA  # 3. JSSE cipher (encryption) algorithm name, e.g., AES_128_CBC  # 4. JSSE message digest algorithm name, e.g., SHA  #  # See SSL/TLS specifications and "Java Cryptography Architecture Standard  # Algorithm Name Documentation" for information about the algorithm names.  #  # Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.  # It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.  # There is no guarantee the property will continue to exist or be of the  # same syntax in future releases.  #  # Example:  # jdk.tls.legacyAlgorithms=DH_anon, DES_CBC, SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5  #  jdk.tls.legacyAlgorithms= \   K_NULL, C_NULL, M_NULL, \   DH_anon, ECDH_anon, \   RC4_128, RC4_40, DES_CBC, DES40_CBC, \   3DES_EDE_CBC  # The pre-defined default finite field Diffie-Hellman ephemeral (DHE)  # parameters for Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS/DTLS) processing.  #  # In traditional SSL/TLS/DTLS connections where finite field DHE parameters  # negotiation mechanism is not used, the server offers the client group  # parameters, base generator g and prime modulus p, for DHE key exchange.  # It is recommended to use dynamic group parameters. This property defines  # a mechanism that allows you to specify custom group parameters.  #  # The syntax of this property string is described as this Java BNF-style:  # DefaultDHEParameters:  # DefinedDHEParameters { , DefinedDHEParameters }  #  # DefinedDHEParameters:  # "{" DHEPrimeModulus , DHEBaseGenerator "}"  #  # DHEPrimeModulus:  # HexadecimalDigits  #  # DHEBaseGenerator:  # HexadecimalDigits  #  # HexadecimalDigits:  # HexadecimalDigit { HexadecimalDigit }  #  # HexadecimalDigit: one of  # 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F a b c d e f  #  # Whitespace characters are ignored.  #  # The "DefinedDHEParameters" defines the custom group parameters, prime  # modulus p and base generator g, for a particular size of prime modulus p.  # The "DHEPrimeModulus" defines the hexadecimal prime modulus p, and the  # "DHEBaseGenerator" defines the hexadecimal base generator g of a group  # parameter. It is recommended to use safe primes for the custom group  # parameters.  #  # If this property is not defined or the value is empty, the underlying JSSE  # provider's default group parameter is used for each connection.  #  # If the property value does not follow the grammar, or a particular group  # parameter is not valid, the connection will fall back and use the  # underlying JSSE provider's default group parameter.  #  # Note: This property is currently used by OpenJDK's JSSE implementation. It  # is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.  #  # Example:  # jdk.tls.server.defaultDHEParameters=  # { \  # FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 \  # 29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD \  # EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 \  # E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED \  # EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE65381 \  # FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF, 2}  # Cryptographic Jurisdiction Policy defaults  #  # Import and export control rules on cryptographic software vary from  # country to country. By default, the JDK provides two different sets of  # cryptographic policy files:  #  # unlimited: These policy files contain no restrictions on cryptographic  # strengths or algorithms.  #  # limited: These policy files contain more restricted cryptographic  # strengths, and are still available if your country or  # usage requires the traditional restrictive policy.  #  # The JDK JCE framework uses the unlimited policy files by default.  # However the user may explicitly choose a set either by defining the  # "crypto.policy" Security property or by installing valid JCE policy  # jar files into the traditional JDK installation location. To better  # support older JDK Update releases, the "crypto.policy" property is not  # defined by default. See below for more information.  #  # The following logic determines which policy files are used:  #  # refers to the directory where the JRE was  # installed and may be determined using the "java.home"  # System property.  #  # 1. If the Security property "crypto.policy" has been defined,  # then the following mechanism is used:  #  # The policy files are stored as jar files in subdirectories of  # /lib/security/policy. Each directory contains a complete  # set of policy files.  #  # The "crypto.policy" Security property controls the directory  # selection, and thus the effective cryptographic policy.  #  # The default set of directories is:  #  # limited | unlimited  #  # 2. If the "crypto.policy" property is not set and the traditional  # US_export_policy.jar and local_policy.jar files  # (e.g. limited/unlimited) are found in the legacy  # /lib/security directory, then the rules embedded within  # those jar files will be used. This helps preserve compatibility  # for users upgrading from an older installation.  #  # 3. If the jar files are not present in the legacy location  # and the "crypto.policy" Security property is not defined,  # then the JDK will use the unlimited settings (equivalent to  # crypto.policy=unlimited)  #  # Please see the JCA documentation for additional information on these  # files and formats.  #  # YOU ARE ADVISED TO CONSULT YOUR EXPORT/IMPORT CONTROL COUNSEL OR ATTORNEY  # TO DETERMINE THE EXACT REQUIREMENTS.  #  # Please note that the JCE for Java SE, including the JCE framework,  # cryptographic policy files, and standard JCE providers provided with  # the Java SE, have been reviewed and approved for export as mass market  # encryption item by the US Bureau of Industry and Security.  #  # Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.  # It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.  #  #crypto.policy=unlimited  #  # The policy for the XML Signature secure validation mode. The mode is  # enabled by setting the property "org.jcp.xml.dsig.secureValidation" to  # true with the javax.xml.crypto.XMLCryptoContext.setProperty() method,  # or by running the code with a SecurityManager.  #  # Policy:  # Constraint {"," Constraint }  # Constraint:  # AlgConstraint | MaxTransformsConstraint | MaxReferencesConstraint |  # ReferenceUriSchemeConstraint | KeySizeConstraint | OtherConstraint  # AlgConstraint  # "disallowAlg" Uri  # MaxTransformsConstraint:  # "maxTransforms" Integer  # MaxReferencesConstraint:  # "maxReferences" Integer  # ReferenceUriSchemeConstraint:  # "disallowReferenceUriSchemes" String { String }  # KeySizeConstraint:  # "minKeySize" KeyAlg Integer  # OtherConstraint:  # "noDuplicateIds" | "noRetrievalMethodLoops"  #  # For AlgConstraint, Uri is the algorithm URI String that is not allowed.  # See the XML Signature Recommendation for more information on algorithm  # URI Identifiers. For KeySizeConstraint, KeyAlg is the standard algorithm  # name of the key type (ex: "RSA"). If the MaxTransformsConstraint,  # MaxReferencesConstraint or KeySizeConstraint (for the same key type) is  # specified more than once, only the last entry is enforced.  #  # Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation. It  # is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.  #  jdk.xml.dsig.secureValidationPolicy=\   disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xslt-19991116,\   disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-md5,\   disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-md5,\   disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#md5,\   maxTransforms 5,\   maxReferences 30,\   disallowReferenceUriSchemes file http https,\   minKeySize RSA 1024,\   minKeySize DSA 1024,\   minKeySize EC 224,\   noDuplicateIds,\   noRetrievalMethodLoops  #  # Serialization process-wide filter  #  # A filter, if configured, is used by java.io.ObjectInputStream during  # deserialization to check the contents of the stream.  # A filter is configured as a sequence of patterns, each pattern is either  # matched against the name of a class in the stream or defines a limit.  # Patterns are separated by ";" (semicolon).  # Whitespace is significant and is considered part of the pattern.  #  # If the system property jdk.serialFilter is also specified, it supersedes  # the security property value defined here.  #  # If a pattern includes a "=", it sets a limit.  # If a limit appears more than once the last value is used.  # Limits are checked before classes regardless of the order in the sequence of patterns.  # If any of the limits are exceeded, the filter status is REJECTED.  #  # maxdepth=value - the maximum depth of a graph  # maxrefs=value - the maximum number of internal references  # maxbytes=value - the maximum number of bytes in the input stream  # maxarray=value - the maximum array length allowed  #  # Other patterns, from left to right, match the class or package name as  # returned from Class.getName.  # If the class is an array type, the class or package to be matched is the element type.  # Arrays of any number of dimensions are treated the same as the element type.  # For example, a pattern of "!example.Foo", rejects creation of any instance or  # array of example.Foo.  #  # If the pattern starts with "!", the status is REJECTED if the remaining pattern  # is matched; otherwise the status is ALLOWED if the pattern matches.  # If the pattern ends with ".**" it matches any class in the package and all subpackages.  # If the pattern ends with ".*" it matches any class in the package.  # If the pattern ends with "*", it matches any class with the pattern as a prefix.  # If the pattern is equal to the class name, it matches.  # Otherwise, the status is UNDECIDED.  #  #jdk.serialFilter=pattern;pattern  #  # RMI Registry Serial Filter  #  # The filter pattern uses the same format as jdk.serialFilter.  # This filter can override the builtin filter if additional types need to be  # allowed or rejected from the RMI Registry or to decrease limits but not  # to increase limits.  # If the limits (maxdepth, maxrefs, or maxbytes) are exceeded, the object is rejected.  #  # Each non-array type is allowed or rejected if it matches one of the patterns,  # evaluated from left to right, and is otherwise allowed. Arrays of any  # component type, including subarrays and arrays of primitives, are allowed.  #  # Array construction of any component type, including subarrays and arrays of  # primitives, are allowed unless the length is greater than the maxarray limit.  # The filter is applied to each array element.  #  # The built-in filter allows subclasses of allowed classes and  # can approximately be represented as the pattern:  #  #sun.rmi.registry.registryFilter=\  # maxarray=1000000;\  # maxdepth=20;\  # java.lang.String;\  # java.lang.Number;\  # java.lang.reflect.Proxy;\  # java.rmi.Remote;\  # sun.rmi.server.UnicastRef;\  # sun.rmi.server.RMIClientSocketFactory;\  # sun.rmi.server.RMIServerSocketFactory;\  # java.rmi.activation.ActivationID;\  # java.rmi.server.UID  #  # RMI Distributed Garbage Collector (DGC) Serial Filter  #  # The filter pattern uses the same format as jdk.serialFilter.  # This filter can override the builtin filter if additional types need to be  # allowed or rejected from the RMI DGC.  #  # The builtin DGC filter can approximately be represented as the filter pattern:  #  #sun.rmi.transport.dgcFilter=\  # java.rmi.server.ObjID;\  # java.rmi.server.UID;\  # java.rmi.dgc.VMID;\  # java.rmi.dgc.Lease;\  # maxdepth=5;maxarray=10000  # CORBA ORBIorTypeCheckRegistryFilter  # Type check enhancement for ORB::string_to_object processing  #  # An IOR type check filter, if configured, is used by an ORB during  # an ORB::string_to_object invocation to check the veracity of the type encoded  # in the ior string.  #  # The filter pattern consists of a semi-colon separated list of class names.  # The configured list contains the binary class names of the IDL interface types  # corresponding to the IDL stub class to be instantiated.  # As such, a filter specifies a list of IDL stub classes that will be  # allowed by an ORB when an ORB::string_to_object is invoked.  # It is used to specify a white list configuration of acceptable  # IDL stub types which may be contained in a stringified IOR  # parameter passed as input to an ORB::string_to_object method.  #  # Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.  # It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.  #  #com.sun.CORBA.ORBIorTypeCheckRegistryFilter=binary_class_name;binary_class_name  #  # JCEKS Encrypted Key Serial Filter  #  # This filter, if configured, is used by the JCEKS KeyStore during the  # deserialization of the encrypted Key object stored inside a key entry.  # If not configured or the filter result is UNDECIDED (i.e. none of the patterns  # matches), the filter configured by jdk.serialFilter will be consulted.  #  # If the system property jceks.key.serialFilter is also specified, it supersedes  # the security property value defined here.  #  # The filter pattern uses the same format as jdk.serialFilter. The default  # pattern allows java.lang.Enum, java.security.KeyRep, java.security.KeyRep$Type,  # and javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec and rejects all the others.  jceks.key.serialFilter = java.lang.Enum;java.security.KeyRep;\   java.security.KeyRep$Type;javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;!*